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I 
n the last two years, Japanese and Chinese financial 
institutions have made a number of investments in 
their U.S. and European counterparts, many of which 
have experienced difficulties as a result of the global 
financial crisis. The form and timing of these invest-
ments have varied, reflective of the different stages of 
development in the Japanese and Chinese financial 
markets. Japan’s recent investments, which have come 
primarily from its three “megabanks,” represent the 
country’s return to the international arena after Japan’s 
financial troubles in the 1990s. China’s recent invest-
ments are more experimental in nature—trial entrées 
into the world of international banking as the country 
looks to become a larger player in global finance. This 
Asia Focus report compares some of the more signifi-
cant investments by Japanese and Chinese financial 
institutions in both the U.S. and Europe, highlighting 




In 2008, Japan’s three largest banks provided capital 
injections to financial institutions in the U.S. and the 
U.K. that were negatively impacted by subprime-
related write-downs and tight liquidity markets. Al-
though Japanese banks are only a few years removed 
from their own local banking crisis, the combination 
of weak domestic lending opportunities and overseas 
banks in need of capital created an opening for Japan 
to renew and strengthen its footprint in the global fi-
nancial market. As a result, large Japanese banks be-
came increasingly interested in expanding abroad, 
while aiming to remain true to their traditionally con-
servative approach to banking. 
 
Mizuho Corporate Bank and Merrill Lynch 
In January 2008, Merrill Lynch (Merrill) announced 
that it had reached agreements to issue US$6.6 billion 
in private placements to long-term investors, primarily 
Korea Investment Corporation, Kuwait Investment 
Authority and Mizuho Corporate Bank (Mizuho). Mi-
zuho’s portion was US$1.2 billion. Less than a month 
beforehand, Merrill had completed a private place-
ment of US$5.6 billion with Temasek Holdings, one 
of Singapore’s two sovereign wealth funds, and Davis 
Selected Advisors. 
 
Mizuho initially said that the arrangement with Merrill 
was purely a “straight investment”; however, the Japa-
nese lender has since strengthened its collaboration 
with Merrill in areas such as project finance, mergers 
and acquisitions, corporate finance, risk-sharing and 
financial advisory projects. As the first major invest-
ment by a Japanese bank in a Wall Street firm since 
the late 1980s, the Mizuho-Merrill deal marked a turn-
ing point for Japan’s banking sector, whose banks 
have recently reemerged as important players in inter-
national financial markets. Japanese media outlets 
have reported that Mizuho intends to continue holding 
its Merrill shares after they convert to Bank of Amer-
ica shares in the future.
i 
 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation and Barclays 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (SMBC) in-
vested approximately £500 million (US$730 million) 
and entered into a collaborative agreement with Bar-
clays PLC (Barclays) in June 2008.
ii,iii The agreement 
provided SMBC with access to Barclays’s investment 
banking platform and its India and Pakistan footprints, 
while Barclays gained access to a wider Japanese and 
Asian network for services such as private banking. 
This deal was part of broader capital raising efforts 
that involved investments from the Qatar Investment 
Authority and a separate Qatari company called Chal-
lenger, as well as an increase in holdings by existing 
investors, including China Development Bank (CDB) 
and Temasek. About five months later, Barclays also 
received investments totaling £500 million (US$730 
million) from Qatar Holding LLC and entities repre-
senting the beneficiary interests of HH Sheikh Man-
sour Bin Zayed Al Nahyan of the United Arab Emir-
ates. 
 
In addition, SMBC’s investment in Barclays relates to 
its April 2007 agreement to acquire the trust admini-
stration and custody operations of Barclays Global 
COUNTRY ANALYSIS UNIT             FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO                                      MARCH 2009 
Recent Japanese and Chinese Investments in U.S. and European Financial Institutions Investors Japan Trust & Banking Co., Ltd. that was 
accomplished through Sumitomo Trust & Banking 
Co., Ltd. (STB). Through the acquisition, STB aimed 
to strengthen its core trust banking and custody opera-
tions business, gain a new client base, and expand its 
assets under custody. Going forward, SMBC and Bar-
clays are expected to work together on private and 
overseas commercial banking. 
 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group and Morgan Stanley 
In October 2008, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 
(MUFG) closed a deal to invest US$9 billion in Mor-
gan Stanley (Morgan) for a 21% ownership stake. The 
two companies had previously announced plans for a 
strategic partnership following Morgan’s conversion 
to a bank holding company (BHC). Morgan became a 
BHC on September 21, 2008, one week after Lehman 
Brothers (Lehman) collapsed. 
 
The Federal Reserve issued approval on October 6, 
2008 for MUFG to acquire up to 24.9% of the voting 
shares of Morgan. The approval cited “unusual and 
exigent circumstances affecting the financial markets” 
in order to justify expeditious action on the proposal, 
as well as the minority, non-controlling nature of the 
investment in Morgan to justify the waiver of public 
notice.
iv The decision was consistent with the Federal 
Reserve’s September 2008 Policy Statement on Equity 
Investments in Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 
which provides additional guidance on minority equity 
investments in banks and BHCs that generally do not 
constitute “control” for purposes of the U.S. Bank 
Holding Company Act.
v In recent months prior, 
MUFG paid approximately US$3.5 billion to increase 
its 65% share ownership to 100% control of Union-




The announcement of MUFG’s investment in Morgan 
came only hours after Nomura, Japan’s largest broker, 
announced it would acquire Lehman’s operations in 
Asia and was in talks to buy parts of its operations in 
Europe. In general, Japanese institutions have been 
interested primarily in relatively conservative, minor-
ity stakes in what were once perceived to be leaders in 
international finance. However, Nomura’s deal to ac-
quire Lehman’s Asia operations has created some fi-
nancial strain for the Japanese firm. 
 
Since the first of these megabank investments, capital 
levels at Japanese banks have felt significant pressure, 
particularly from the banks’ relatively large equity 
exposures and cross-shareholding agreements. Fur-
thermore, Japan’s economy has experienced a sharp 
decline due to the global financial crisis. As a result, it 
is likely that major acquisitions by Japanese financial 
institutions will be on hold until not only global finan-
cial markets become less volatile, but also Japanese 
banks are able to strengthen capital levels and address 
internal structural challenges. 
 
China 
Whereas Japan’s recent investments in overseas finan-
cial institutions have stemmed primarily from its 
banking and brokerage industries, China’s recent in-
vestments have come from an even broader range of 
organizations, including a policy bank, an insurance 
group and a sovereign wealth fund. As China strives 
to become a bigger actor in the international financial 
arena, these international investments serve as a 
means to achieve an assortment of long-term strategic 
goals—to gain technical expertise, enter new markets 
and pursue higher rates of return on national reserves. 
A summary of the most significant investments is in-
cluded below. 
  
China Development Bank and Barclays 
As referenced in the description of the SMBC deal, 
Barclays issued new ordinary shares to CDB and Te-
masek in August 2007. CDB purchased a 3.1% stake 
in Barclays for £1.5 billion (US$2.2 billion). Founded 
in 1994, CDB reports directly to the State Council of 
China and specializes in financing infrastructure de-
velopments, core industries, and key national projects. 
Although CDB is one of China’s three policy banks, it 
received a capital injection of US$20 billion from 
Central Huijin in December 2007 to facilitate its trans-




The August 2007 investment by CDB broadened the 
bank’s relationship with Barclays to that of a strategic 
partnership. Barclays agreed to assist CDB in its evo-
lution into a commercially operated bank by providing 
training and advice in fields such as risk management, 
corporate governance, customer service, and informa-
tion technology. In return, CDB agreed to use Bar-
clays Global Investors as one of its preferred asset 
managers. As such, the partnership offered Barclays 
increased access to the rapidly growing Chinese mar-
ket, with a particular focus on wealth and asset man-
agement. It helped CDB to better serve Chinese corpo-
rations with international commercial activities by 
gaining access to Barclays’s extensive global fran-chise. The two parties also agreed to cross-refer clients 
and jointly develop new international business oppor-
tunities. 
 
As a result of market stresses, Barclays’s stock price 
has declined substantially since the initial CDB invest-
ment and the U.K. bank has gone through multiple 
capital raising exercises in the last year. Therefore, 
despite the breadth of longer-term benefits afforded by 
this type of strategic partnership, the sharp decrease in 
the value of CDB’s investment in Barclays has raised 
concerns among Chinese policy makers regarding the 
appeal of such overseas investments. 
 
Ping An Life Insurance and Fortis 
In November 2007, China’s Ping An Life Insurance 
Company (Ping An) acquired a 4.18% equity stake in 
Belgium’s Fortis. The stake was later raised to 4.99%. 
Ping An is China’s second largest life insurance com-
pany, and like Fortis, Ping An’s parent group follows 
a multi-pronged business model that integrates insur-
ance, banking and asset management. Building upon 
this initial investment, the two companies signed an 
agreement in April 2008 to establish a global asset 
management partnership, whereby Ping An’s parent 
group would acquire a 50% equity stake in the global 
asset management arm of Fortis for €2.15 billion 
(US$2.99 billion). 
 
However, in the months following these two deals, 
Fortis’s stock price experienced a substantial decline 
in value. Consequently, Ping An recognized a sizeable 
mark-to-market loss of approximately RMB 15.7 bil-
lion (US$2.3 billion) on its investment in Fortis.
viii In 
September 2008, Fortis received capital injections to-
taling €11.2 billion (US$15.6 billion) from the govern-
ments of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands 
in exchange for 49% of the respective Fortis bank in-
stitutions in each country. Soon after the government 
injections, Ping An’s parent group and Fortis an-
nounced that they would not be able to complete their 
proposed asset management partnership, citing “the 
current severe market disruption and the ongoing un-
certainty in the global capital markets.” 
 
Despite the losses, representatives of Ping An have 
said that the company considers its investment in For-
tis to have been a beneficial exercise in overseas in-
vesting.
ix Analysts expect that Ping An’s exploratory 
investment will provide useful lessons for itself and 
other Chinese companies when evaluating future inter-
national financial sector opportunities. 
 
China Investment Corporation and Morgan Stanley 
(and others) 
China Investment Corporation (CIC), China’s first 
sovereign wealth fund, was established in September 
2007 with US$200 billion under management.
x About 
three months after its inception, CIC invested approxi-
mately US$5 billion in Morgan. As is the case with 
many long-term passive investments, the provisions of 
the deal capped CIC’s stake at 9.9%, gave CIC no spe-
cial rights of ownership, and offered CIC no role in 
the management of Morgan. From Morgan’s perspec-
tive, this equity investment enhanced the company’s 
capital position, deepened its historic ties with China, 
and provided international growth opportunities. For 
CIC, the deal offered a chance to invest in a well-
respected U.S. financial company and an expected 
higher rate of return on China’s foreign exchange re-
serves. 
 
CIC has also made investments in other U.S. financial 
sector firms, including, for example, US$3 billion in 
the Blackstone Group in May 2007 (before CIC’s offi-
cial launch date). As of October 2008, CIC’s initial 
equity stake in Blackstone had lost roughly two-thirds 
of its original book value. CIC’s investment in Mor-
gan has also experienced significant losses. 
 
In general, analysts have cited various reasons for the 
relatively unsuccessful performance of CIC’s invest-
ments to-date. One reason is CIC’s date of establish-
ment; it entered the international financial markets just 
before a severe downturn. A second reason is CIC’s 
internal composition and structure. For example, CIC 
faces internal challenges in hiring and retaining ex-
perienced asset managers. Mainland-based Caijing 
magazine has stated that senior positions at CIC carry 
a salary of about US$100,000, far below international 
standards.
xi Furthermore, CIC’s staff base is still gain-
ing experience in terms of evaluating complex, inter-
national financial investments. As an organization, 
CIC is operating in a learning phase—internalizing its 
mission, setting parameters and expectations for in-
vestments, and managing staffing challenges. 
 
Other Attempted Investments 
Two key deals with Chinese financial sector compa-
nies made headlines, but were not completed. Al-
though widely reported, the October 2007 deal be-
tween Bear Stearns and China’s CITIC Securities 
(CITIC) to swap stakes was never consummated. By 
the first quarter of 2008, CITIC said it was rethinking its agreement to invest in the U.S. company. Follow-
ing JPMorgan’s acquisition of Bear Stearns in late 
March 2008, CITIC announced a formal termination 
of negotiations. Whether the deal was delayed by bu-
reaucratic inefficiency or an awareness of market 
trends, the outcome proved to be beneficial to CITIC 
given the U.S. firm’s quick sale to JPMorgan. Media 
outlets also reported that Citibank was in talks with 
CDB in January 2008 to obtain a capital injection. 
However, the deal did not come to fruition. Many ana-
lysts speculated that the Chinese government, mindful 
of recent disappointing investments in other foreign 
financial companies, would not approve the deal. 
 
These recent Chinese investments in overseas finan-
cial institutions have little in common except their 
pragmatic nature as pilot deals. While they may not 
follow an obvious pattern, they do demonstrate 
China’s step-by-step approach to familiarizing itself 
with global financial markets. Recent declines in the 
value of these investments have put pressure on Chi-
nese leaders to scrutinize future deals so that national 
finances are more insulated from extreme volatility. 
These domestic pressures will likely impact the form 




Foreign financial institutions have employed various 
strategies to try to protect their recent investments.  
For example, many deals ensure that the investor is 
given some form of representation on the target bank’s 
board of directors. However, board representation is 
often limited to a position with non-voting status. In 
its deal with Fortis, Ping An was entitled to propose 
the appointment of one non-executive director to the 
Fortis Board. CDB was likewise entitled to nominate a 
non-executive director to the Barclays Board. 
 
Particularly when substantial stakes are involved, the 
issue of “control” can complicate potential invest-
ments. In the case of the U.S., the Federal Reserve’s 
Policy Statement on Equity Investments in Banks and 
Bank Holding Companies has created more leeway 
than in the past, enabling, for instance, the expedited 
approval of MUFG’s 21% investment in Morgan. Un-
der the terms of the deal, MUFG agreed to be a pas-
sive investor in Morgan, explicitly committing not to 
exercise a controlling influence over Morgan’s man-
agement. MUFG agreed not to have more than one 
representative serve on the board of directors of Mor-
gan or its subsidiaries. 
 
Public relations concerns can also complicate potential 
investments. For example, a number of foreign finan-
cial institutions have recently sold their shares in Chi-
nese banks to raise capital, which could make China 
reluctant to invest in those firms in the near term. 
 
Rather than looking overseas for possible investments, 
Asian financial institutions are likely to focus more on 
domestic issues in the coming months. While global 
financial markets remain volatile and strained, many 
Asian banks are expected to face both declining asset 
quality and pressure from domestic leaders to support 
local economies through increased lending. In addi-
tion, Asian institutions may be wary of investing in 
U.S. and European banks given the dilution that possi-
ble further public equity stakes would create. Looking 
forward, cross-border financial sector investments by 
Japan and China will likely return to a more traditional 
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Key Recent Japanese Investments in U.S. and European Financial Institutions 
       
Target Institution  Date  Investor  Deal Value  Approximate Stake 
Merrill Lynch  Jan-08  Mizuho Corporate Bank  US$1.2 billion  2% 
Barclays Jun-08  Sumitomo Mitsui     
Banking Corporation  US$730 million  2% 
Morgan Stanley  Oct-08  Mitsubishi UFJ          
Financial Group  US$9 billion  21% 
Sources: Various investor relations websites and media reports   
      
      
Key Recent Chinese Investments in U.S. and European Financial Institutions 
       
Target Institution  Date  Investor  Deal Value  Approximate Stake 
Blackstone Group  May-07  China Investment Corp.  US$3 billion  10% 
Barclays Aug-07  China Development 
Bank  US$2.2 billion  3.1% 
Fortis  Nov-07  Ping An Life Insurance US$2.5  billion  4.18%* 
Morgan Stanley  Dec-07  China Investment Corp.  US$5 billion  9.9% 
* = Stake was later increased to 4.99%     
Sources: Various investor relations websites and media reports   